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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MELVIN J. STAKER,
Plaintiff-Respondent

vs.

CASE NO. 18203

HUNTINGTON CLEVELAND
IRRIGATION COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by plaintiff on March 27, 1979,
against defendant to secure payment of the total sum of $5,031.50
together with interest from the defendant Irrigation Company on
account of alleged overpayments made by plaintiff to defendant
of amounts paid on an alleged water subscription from August 1,
1966 through May 1, 1969 for the Joe's Valley Project.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendant's substitute attorney (TR 3) retained two days
earlier filed in open Court a motion to amend the pleadings on
the date of trial, November 6, 1981, pursuant to Rule 15(a)

(TR 3).

Defendant's substitute attorney, the day before trial, informed
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plaintiff's attorney he would raise the defense of statute of
limitations (TR 4).

The Court stated the motion would prejudice

the plaintiff (TR 4), took the motion under advisement (TR 8) and
proceeded to try the case.

Immediately after the case was con-

cluded the Court denied defendant's motion to amend the pleadings
to raise the defense of the statute of limitations (TR 142).

On

December 10, 1981, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks dismissal of the trial court's
judgment and an Order that defendant's motion to amend to plead
the statute of limitations as a defense be granted.
In the alternative, defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment
awarding plaintiff interest in the sum of $3,283.00 reducing said
judgment to the sum of $5,031.50.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff brought suit to secure payment of the total sum of
$5,031.50 from the defendant irrigation company on account of
alleged overpayments by plaintiff to defendant of amounts due on
a water subscription:
8/ 1/66

Overpayment on subscription

$1,110.00

1/11/67

$1.55 on 1,110 acre feet

$1,720.50

2/29/68

$1.55 on 1,110 acre feet

$1,720.50

5/12/69

$1.55 on 310 acre feet
-

480.50

2 -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

together with interest on said sum.
On March 1, 1975, more than 5 years after the last payment on
the alleged subscriptions, plaintiff filed a written demand with
defendant (P. Exh. 17, TR 35).
On March 27, 1979, plaintiff filed his complaint.
answer was filed on April 11, 1979, by Thomas

o.

Defendant's

Parker, its attorney

of record.
The Notice of Trial Setting of February 18, 1981 and the notice
of Trial Setting of May 5, 1981, was sent to E. J. Skeen, 536 E.
4th S., Salt Lake City, Utah, not to Thomas

o.

Parker, defendant's

attorney of record.
On November 5, 1981, the day before trial, defendant's substitute attorney,

s. v.

Litizzette, notified plaintiff's attorney that

he would move to amend the Answer to include the defense of the
statute of limitations (TR 3).
On the day of trial, November 6, 1981, by motion to amend,
defendant's substitute attorney raised the defense of the statute
of limitations pursuant to Rule 15 (a) -U. R.C. P.

(TR 3)

Plaintiff's attorney resisted the motion to amend claiming
prejudice (TR 5).
The Court took the matter under advisement and allowed the
plaintiff to proceed to try the case (TR 8).
At the conclusion, after both sides had rested, the Court
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denied defendant's motion to raise the defense of the statute of
limitations (TR 142) and took the matter under advisement (TR 145).
On December 10, 1981, the court entered judgment against the
defendant in the sum of $5,031.50 together with interest in the
sum of $3,283.00 making a total judgment of $8,344.25.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
SUBSTITUTE ATTORNEY'S MOTION MADE ON THE DAY OF TRIAL TO
AMEND THE ANSWER TO SET UP THE BAR OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION~
The applicable statute of limitations in this case is Section
78-12-25 u.c.A. which provides that an action upon a contract,
obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument must be
commenced within 4 years ...

Pursuant to this Section the plain-

tiff's right of action was barred on May 12, 1973, 4 years from
the date of the last alleged overpayment.
The applicable rule concerning the pleading of the statute
of limitations as an affirmative defense is Rule 8(c) U.R.C.P.
The applicable rule governing when pleadings can be amended
is Rule 15(a) U.R.C.P., which provides that a party may amend his
pleadings only by leave of Court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so

- 4 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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/

require~

The issue is whether under Rule lS(a) the lower court abused
its discretion in denying a substitute attorney's motion to amend
to plead the bar of the statute of limitations on the day of trial.
Plaintiff's counsel argued that to allow the amendment would

be prejudicial to plaintiff (TR 5) citing Goeltz v. Continental
Bank and Trust, 5 Utah 2d 204, 299 P.2d 832, in support.
In Goeltz, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"Statutes of limitations as statutes of repose have a useful
function in our law system.
Sometimes they prevent the prosecution of a stale claim after proof of the facts are unavailable, and in such a case the interests of justice would
require that leave to amend be freely granted.
In other cases
such defense merely prevents a recovery of a just claim.
Except
against the estate of a deceased person such defense may always
be waived. Here defendant seeks leave to amend after all the
evidence is in, (emphasis added) ... "
Preliminarily the court observed that on p. 206 of the Goeltz
decision the defendant asked leave to amend after all of the evidence
was in (TR p. 6 L.

7-si

Plaintiff's counsel and the court made the following statements:
"MR. McIFF:

That is correct.
(Emphasis added;

THE COURT:

So that is not our case here today.

MR. McIFF:

No, it is not.
I agree with that yourHonor.
But
the basic thrust of what the Court said here was
that the statute of limitations is a technical
defense and prevents the matter being adjudicated
on the merits."
(TR p. 6, L. 9-14)

The court took defendant's motion under advisement and proceeded
to try the case (TR 8).
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At the conclusion of the trial the court denied defendant's
motion to amend (TR 142) and stated:
"THE COURT: Well, gentlemen, first of all, just let me state
that during the noon recess I had an opportunity to go through
the Goeltz versus Continental Bank and Trust case relative to
the question of filing this motion to amend to include the
defense of statute of limitations -- to review that case and
the couple of cases that Mr. Mciff presented to the Court.
And I haveconcludedthat within the reasoning of that case,
that the amendment should not be allowed at this late date;
in that if there were some substantial rights that the defendant wanted at this time to bring in because of the statute
of limitations, then we would allow it. But where it is upon
purely as a technical defense, and where it seems that most
of the material issues in this case have been brought before
the Court, it just doesn't appear that that technical defense
should be imposed because it is strictly in the nature of a
technical defense. So the Court in accordance with the ruling of that case, we'll deny the motion to file the amended
answer at this late date. This case has been set, I believe,
twice before •.. "
(TR 142)
Apparently, the court concluded Goeltz controlled and was
authority for the proposition that on the day of trial defendant's
substitute attorney of

~

days could not move to amend to plead the

bar of the statute of limitations.
The facts in this case fall into the category of cases wherein
the fact that failure to plead the statute of limitations in the
original pleadings was due to oversight, negligence or ignorance
of counsel.

The following cases are cited in 59 A.L.R. 2d §6 p. 194,

et seq. as representative of fact situations which were held to
justify or require a trial court's allowance of an amendment asserting the defense of the statute of limitations.
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Illinois Steel v. Budzisz,

(1900) 106 Wis. 499 NW, where 3 days

after the substitution of a new attorney, on the day of trial there
was no abuse of discretion in granting amendment to plead the bar of
the statute of limitations.
Santiago v. Amangual,

(1914) 7 Puerto Rico F 308, where defen-

dant's motion for leave to amend to plead the statute of limitations
was made 2 days before the case was set for trial.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Denver,

(1931)

90 Colo 20, 6 P2d 6,

where defendant's motion to plead the statute of limitations was
made 5 days before trial, particularly see
Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,

(1956) 229 F2d 714,

where defendant's motion for leave to amend to plead the statute of
limitations was allowed at the second trial after reversal of the
first trial.

In Emich the Court stated:

"In the instant case defendants pleaded the statute of
limitations below after the case was remanded for a new
trial, a remand made necessary by prejudicial errors
which occurred in the first trial, errors for which
the plaintiffs must bear at least part of the responsibility.
Rule 15(a) does not distinguish between amendments after
appeal and remand and those before appeal. Nor do the decisions make such a distinction. Bowles v. Biberman Bros., 3
Cir., 152 F.2d 700; Guth v. Texas Co., 7 Cir. 155 F.2d 563.
Emich followed in Greninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638 (1966)
Similarly in Romo v. Reyes,

(1976) 26 Ariz App. 374, 548 P.2d

1186, where the Court held an answer may be amended at any time

- 7 -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

before trial.

In this case the court stated:

"[4,5]
Respondent maintains, of course, that he will indeed
be prejudiced by allowing an amendment since his claim will
be barred by the two-year statute of limitations. We have
said that even where a party is prejudiced, the prejudice
must be balanced against the hardship to the moving party
if leave to amend is denied. Green Reservoir Flood Control
Dist. v. Willmoth, 15 Ariz App. 406, 489 P.2d 69 (1971) ."
Romo followed in Trujillo v. Brasfield,
P.2d 46.

(1978) Ariz App. 579

In Trujillo the Court stated:

"The respondents argue that even though Rule 15(a),
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., states
that 'Leave to amend shall be freely given when justice
requires.' to do so in this case would burden them with
undue prejudice and cause the action to be decided on a
technicality, rather than on the merits. The respondents
have failed to deal with the case of Romo v. Reyes, 26
Ariz App. 374, 548 P.2d 1186 (1976), cited by the petitioners, which effectively destroys their argument."
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that, the trial
court abused its discretion and should have allowed defendant's
substitute attorney to plead the bar of the statute of limitations.
Goeltz does not apply since defendant's motion to amend was timely
made before any evidence had been introduced.

Pursuant to Rule lS(a)

defendant's motion to amend should have been freely granted.
The judgment of the trial court is therefore erroneous and
must be reversed.

- 8 -
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ARGUMENT
POINT II
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS CONTRARY TO LAW IN THAT
COURT DID NOT PROPERLY NOTICE DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY OF RECORD
OF THE DATE OF TRIAL.
The applicable rule governing Notice of Trial is Rule 4.1 of
the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of
the state of Utah.
Rule 4.l(a) states:
"Upon oral or written stipulation or order of the court, a
trial date may be obtained at any time and shall be set at
a date that the convenience of the calendar may allow. Notice
of the trial date shall be mailed by the clerk of the court
to all counsel of record (emphasis added) or the parties who
are not represented by counsel of record, advising them of
said date and a copy of the notice shall be filed. Once
cases have been set for trial, continuances will be granted
only in accordance with these rules."
In the instant case two notices of trial setting were not sent
to Thomas O. Parker, the attorney of record.

The failure of the

Court to give proper notice of trial was discovered by defendant's
substitute attorney in preparing the Docketing Statement required
by this appeal.
75 Am Jur 2d §6 p. 123 states:
"While practice statutes, rules of practice, or rules of court
frequently require the giving of notice of trial, in the absence
of the statute or rule, it is not necessary to give a party
litigant notice, since it is up to the litigant to keep himself apprised of the time the case is set for trial. When
such notice is required by statute or rule, defendants who
have entered a general appearance are entitled to be notified,
in person or through their counsel, of any hearing wher~ evidence will be taken on the merits of the case." (Emphasis added)
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Hawkins v. Aldridge, 211 Ind. 332 7 NE 2d 34.
See also the cases cited in 109 A.L.R. 1205.

For the reasons

set forth above the judgment should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT III
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S SUBSTITUTE ATTORNEY'S MOTION TO RAISE
THE BAR OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS THE PLAINTIFF IS noT AS
A MATTER OF LAW ENTITLED TO INTEREST.
There is no statute or rule relating to pre-judgment interest
under the facts of this case.
Rule 54(e) governs interest on any verdict or decision from
the time it was rendered but here

the court awarded plaintiff in-

terest in the sum of $3,283.00 from and after January 1, 1973 to
November 16, 1981.

(See paragraph 2 of the Judgment)

There is no evidence whatsoever in the transcript regarding
pre-judgment interest.
There being no evidence the only grounds for awarding interest
to plaintiff would appear to be that the court concluded plaintiff
was entitled to interest as a matter of law.

(Emphasis added)

In 22 Am Jur 2d §179 it is stated:
"Interest by way of damages has been defined as interest
allowed in actions for breach of contract or tort for the
unlawful detention of money found to be due. This type

- 10 -
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of interest is frequently called 'moratory interest.'
Interest, as a part of damages, is allowed, not by application of
arbitrary rules, but as a result of the justice of the individual case and as compensation to the injured party."
See Farnsworth v. Jensen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 531, where
the contract for the purchase of land provided for payment of
interest at the rate of 6% per annum.
See also, L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Const. Co., Inc.,
· Utah, 608 P. 2d 626.
In 22 Am Jur 2d §183 p. 261 it is stated:
"In contract actions a distinction is often drawn between
liquidated and unliquidated claims, interest being allowed
as of right in the former and either denied or allowed
only in the discretion of the court in the latter."
In 22 Am Jur 2d §182 p. 260 it is stated:
"Recent cases, however, approach the problem in a more
direct fashion and allow interest on an unliquidated
claim when justice and fairness so require."
It is submitted that in the instant case the allowance of
interest to plaintiff would not be in the interest of justice and
fairness.
Here the amounts allegedly due plaintiff were paid for the
period from 8/1/66 through 5/12/69 (P. Exh. 17, TR 35).

The Court

allowed plaintiff interest from January 1, 1973 to November 16, 1981,
a period of 8 years and 11 months, almost 9 years.

- 11 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In 51 Am Jur 2d §24 p. 608 it is stated:
"If the obligation to pay interest is merely incidental to the
principal obligation, forming a part of the contract governing
that obligation, the bar of the statute of limitations upon
the right to recover the principal also bars the right to
recover interest, although the interest claimed accrued within
the statutory period."
See Annotation:

115 ALR 728, 729.

For the foregoing reasons, in the alternative, this case should
be reversed in part.

Plaintiff should be awarded only the principal

amount claimed from defendant in the sum of $5,031.50.

(See para-

graph 1 of the judgment)
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's
substitute attorney's motion to plead the bar of the statute of
limitations.
The court's failure to give proper notice to the attorney of
record is an added reason to reverse the judgment of the lower court
In the alternative, however, if the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant's substitute attorney's motion
to raise the bar of the statute of limitations the plaintiff is
not entitled to interest and the lower court's judgment should be
entered against defendant only in the sum of $5,031.50 the principal
amount claimed by plaintiff.
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